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I 
RULES, STANDARDS, AND THE INTERNAL POINT 
OF VIEW 
Dale A. Nance* 
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes presented his now famous "bad man" 
theory of law: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who fmds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience. . . . The prophecies of what the court will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.1 
This view has had profound influence among strands of legal thought 
otherwise as diverse as American Legal Realism and Law and Economics. 
By some accounts, it has become an integral part of the dominant 
instrumentalism of American legal thought.2 
But it is ultimately misguided. One of the contributions H.L.A. Hart 
made to modem jurisprudence was to remind us of the importance of the 
fact that many people in a legal system take what he called the "internal 
point of view" toward its laws. Hart wrote, 
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal 
or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one 
hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so 
see their own and other persons' behavior in tenus of the rules, and those 
who, on the other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the 
external point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of the 
difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do justice to the complexity 
of the facts is to remember the presence of both points of view and not to 
define one of them out of existence. 3 
This observation was part of a pointed rejection of theories, like that of 
Holmes, which would filter out the perspective of the person who takes 
such an internal point of view.4 The relevance of Hart's observation has 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. For comments on a draft, I am 
grateful to Peter Gerhart, Juliet Kostritsky, and Andy Morriss. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459, 461 
(1897). 
2. See Robert Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982). 
3. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 90-91 (2d ed. 1994). 
4. The distinction between the internal and external points of view is a practical one, 
relating to reasons for action, not a theoretical one, relating to the attitudes of observers of a 
legal system, although one can (and Hart did) address a different distinction between a 
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been confirmed by empirical studies indicating that there are many reasons 
other than fear of sanctions that motivate people to obey the law. 5 Holmes 
notwithstanding, it is hardly "pretentious" to recognize such a salient fact in 
articulating a general theory of law and legal obligation.6 
Hart's analytical insight, however, only hints at an important normative 
claim, one which is a running, if implicit, theme in the work of scholars 
such as Lon Fulier and Friedrich Hayek. 7 The normative claim is that it is 
valuable that people take this internal point of view, that the health of a 
legal system qua legal system is, in no small part, a function of how many 
of its citizens-how firmly and how consistently-take the internal point of 
view toward its laws.8 That may seem obvious, but my preliminary purpose 
here is to elaborate (in Part I) on why it is so. The general thrust of the 
present discussion is that, in addition to its contribution to economizing on 
enforcement costs, there is a connection between the internal point of view 
and the aspiration to republican self-government: the greater the incidence 
of the former, the greater the achievement of the latter, ceteris paribus. 
This fact imbues the notion of a healthy legal system with a crucially 
normative component that goes beyond, and need not be inconsistent with, 
efficient social organization. 
My principal, presumably less obvious, purpose is to explore (in Parts II-
VI) how this normative claim may have significant implications for the 
selection and use of particular forms of legal norms. Specifically, my 
present topic is the "rules versus standards" debate. Although Hart wrote in 
terms of attitudes toward rules, obviously the internaVexternal distinction 
can be generalized to a difference in attitude about legal norms, whether 
rules or standards, and we can consider the impiications of the need to 
nurture and sustain the internal point of view toward legal norms. I argue 
that, under a realistic depiction of the social and economic conditions in 
which legal norms are recognized, adopted, or promulgated, a fairly strong 
case can be made for the employment of relatively definite norms ("rules") 
over the employment of less definite, balancing or discretionary norms 
("standards") in regulating nonofficial conduct, again ceteris paribus. This 
sympathetic (or hermeneutic) theoretical understanding (in which Hart himself was engaged) 
and a more behaviorist theoretical understanding of actors in a legal system. See Scott J. 
Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157 (2006). 
5. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 3-7, 24-26, 178 (1990). 
6. Elsewhere, I have illustrated the important implications of this point for more narrow 
legal issues by using the internaVexternal distinction to articulate the proper way to 
understand the difference between property rules and liability rules. See Dale A. Nance, 
Guidance Rules and Enforcemel)t Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 Va. L. Rev. 837 
(1997). 
7. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969); 1-3 Friedrich Hayek, 
Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy (1973, 1976, 1979). 
8. For convenience, I refer to "citizens" as the nonofficial subjects of law to distinguish 
such people from those who are acting in an official capacity. I recognize, of course, that 
many subjects of law are not citizens in the technical sense, but it will be unnecessary to 
distinguish between citizens and noncitizen subjects. 
! 
2006] 
is bee 
applic< 
anticip 
fosteril 
substm 
extern1 
recogn 
fixed c 
which 
To 1 
correct 
preferr 
particu 
legal 1 
nonoff 
second 
conduc 
are dir 
prefere 
terrnin1 
holds a 
I ad· 
standm 
issues 
govern 
emplo~ 
My cl< 
law, tc 
so mew 
the sec 
of proc 
proced 
official 
9. 
and "se· 
conclusi 
conclusi 
"norms" 
characte 
10. ' 
Rules m 
standard 
II. , 
6 Cardo; 
12. ] 
world, s· 
Lempert 
admissic 
')(\()hl 
~VVVJ 
DT TT L'C' C''T' A 7\TT\ AD T\C" 
.J.\.V.L.J.L:.JJJ1 JJ.l.fl.l V.L..J.i'l...l\..L./JJ · 1289 
is because rule-based decision making by officials facilitates self-
application of legal norms by citizens in a manner that more accurately 
anticipates official judgment, which in tum is an important ingredient for 
fostering the internal point of view among the citizenry and preventing 
substantive injustice in the presence of those who nonetheless take the 
external point of view. An important feature of this argument is the 
recognition that the extent of acceptance of the internal point of view is not 
fixed over time, but can be affected by many factors, including the form in 
which laws are adopted and implemented. 
To be clear from the outset, I do not claim that rules are always the 
correct instruments of legal guidance. I claim only that rules are to be 
preferred when the situation admits of their use, especially within a 
particular domain of legal norms. That particular domain is the subset of 
legal norms that are principally directed at regulating the conduct of 
nonofficial citizens (or citizens in their unofficial capacity) and only 
secondarily at regulating the conduct of officials in their review of the 
conduct of citizens. To put the point more precisely, the more legal norms 
are directed at citizens rather than officials, the greater the strength of the 
preference for rules, ceteris paribus. Again generalizing from Hart's 
terminology, one can refer to the context in which the asserted preference 
holds as the context of "primary" norms. 9 
I address only in passing the question of the choice between rules and 
standards in governing the behavior of officials. In part, this is because the 
issues in that context are quite different, concentrating on matters of intra-
governmental management.IO In part, this is because it is unlikely that the 
employment of standards can be wholly eliminated from a legal system. 11 
My claim is that standards should be squeezed out of a certain domain of 
law, to the extent possible, even if they must reappear in some fmm 
somewhere else. For similar reasons, I exclude the law of procedure from 
the scope of my thesis. While it is possible for citizens to take cognizance 
of procedural norms, lay citizens are not generally the intended audience; 
procedural norms are primarily directed at officials and those quasi-
officials-lawyers-who assist in the operation of the legal system.12 
9. Hart distinguished between "primary rules," which govern the conduct of citizens, 
and "secondary rules," which "specify the ways in which the primary rules may be 
conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation 
conclusively determined." Hart, supra note 3, at 94. Referring to primary and secondary 
"norms" generalizes Hart's language to include both "rules" and "standards," as 
characterized in later discussion. 
10. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-
Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807 (2002) {discussing the choice of rule or 
standard in deciding the form of judicial review of administrative lawmaking). 
11. See, e.g., Paul M. Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 
6 Cardozo L. Rev. 947 (1985). 
12. For a discussion of the role of rules and standards in one pocket of the procedural 
world, see Dale A. Nance, The Wisdom ofDallas County, in Evidence Stories 305 (Richard 
Lempert ed., 2006) (addressing the role of standard-based judicial discretion in the 
admission ofhearsay evidence). 
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Thus, I argue in support of the quite traditional proposition that citizens 
should be given maximum practicable definiteness in the laws that regulate 
their non-litigation conduct. 13 If there is reason to defend this seemingly 
unexciting proposition, it is that the proposition has been challenged in 
recent decades from a variety of directions. Some challenge the traditional 
wisdom as arbitrarily privileging the value of autonomy, thereby neglecting 
altruism.l4 Others in effect challenge it as insufficiently sensitive to the 
law's role in maximizing social wealth and the dependence of that role on 
context. 15 Still others believe that sacrificing ad hoc flexibility to ex ante 
predictability is a bad idea so long as the state has monopoly control over 
the content of legal norms provided for citizens. 16 I will defend the 
traditional wisdom against such challenges. 
I. THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW, OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT, AND SELF-
GOVERNANCE 
Corresponding to Hart's distinction between the internal and external 
points of view, legal theory has long recognized that (at least) two quite 
distinguishable purposes are intended to be served by law. One is to 
prevent or rectify wrongdoing by individuals who are unable or unwilling to 
internalize what the promulgators of law consider to be serious social 
norms, to deal with the recalcitrant or "bad" person who takes the external 
point of view toward such norms. This purpose corresponds to an 
"enforcement" function of law. The other purpose is to provide guidance to 
individuals in those contexts where serious social norms are contested or 
otherwise uncertain, to resolve disputes over such norms for the use of the 
law-abiding or "good" but "puzzled" person. This purpose corresponds to a 
"guidance" function. 17 The serious social norms that might require 
enforcement may or may not be those that are articulated in law in response 
to the need for guidance; some serious social norms are recognized as law 
13. The indicated preference has ancient roots. Plato went so far as to opine that "unless 
you are defmite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become 
law." 2 The Dialogues of Plato 491 (B. Jowett trans., Random House 3d ed. 1937). Aristotle 
was less limiting, but still endorsed a preference for rules: 
Rightly constituted laws should be the fmal sovereign; and personal rule, whether 
it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in 
those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general 
rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement. 
The Politics of Aristotle 127 (Ernest Barker trans. and ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962). The 
Roman law maxim put it simply, "Ius finitum et debet esse et potest" ("the law can and 
should be definite"). Okko Behrends, Formality and Substance in Classical Roman Law, in 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal Systems 207, 215 
(Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994). 
14. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976). 
15. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke 
L.J. 557 (1992). 
16. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 199. 
17. See Nance, supra note 6, at 859. 
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solely for the purpose of enforcement, not because there is senous 
controversy or uncertainty about their social authority. 
A "utopia of legality" would contain no recalcitrant individuals, no 
persons who take the external point of view toward legal norms. In such a 
world, however, there would still be need for the guidance function, relating 
to the law-abiding. This need is occasioned by good faith conflicts on 
serious matters of principle that must be resolved, however tentatively, and 
by problems of coordination that must be resolved, however arbitrarily, in 
order for life in a community to continue without conflict. To be sure, a 
more complete utopia might not involve any such conflicts or coordination 
problems, but in such a world there would be no need of law at al1. 18 In 
contrast, trying to imagine a society in which law's guidance function is not 
needed, in which the law's sole function is enforcement, is difficult indeed. 
Because any organized enforcement function requires guidance norms 
regulating adjudication and the application of sanctions, only the simplest 
of societies could sustain law that is pure enforcement.19 Given this core 
recognition of the importance of the guidance function to the point of law, 
dealing with recalcitrants is, arguably, secondary and contingent, not to say 
uninlportant. 20 
Already, my first claim-that it is valuable that citizens take the internal 
point of view-seems at least plausible. If citizens turn to law for the 
resolution of their disagreements, one would expect them to internalize the 
law's resolutions. One might plausibly argue that citizens have an 
obligation to do so.21 And that is one sense in which one might say that it is 
valuable that citizens take the internal point of view. But many citizens 
may not see it that way. For example, a citizen may plausibly believe that 
he has a residual right, perhaps a duty, to follow his own moral views,22 
or-less admirably-he may want the law to resolve his controversy with 
others as long as the law resolves it the way that he wants it resolved, 
feeling free to disregard the law as guidance if the law goes the other way, 
attending then prudentially only to the risk of law's sanctions. 
18. For an in-depth treatment of the implications of the need for authoritative resolution 
of such conflicts among people of good faith, see Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The 
Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law (2001). 
19. Jd. at 218-19; cf Hart, supra note 3, at 89-91. Hart, of course, argued that the 
minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system include officials' acceptance of the 
internal point of view toward the secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. 
See id. at 113. 
20. See Gerald J. Postema, Positivism, I Presume? ... Comments on Schauer's "Rules 
and the Rule of Law," 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 797 (1991). Postema argues, 
Law uses both of these devices [internal guidance and external obstacles]; 
sometimes one is more prominent, sometimes the other. But internal guidance is 
(and, I would maintain, must be) the primary device. That is, it is characteristic of, 
perhaps essential to, law to provide (or at least purport to provide) us with reasons 
why we should act in certain ways. 
Id. at 799. 
21. For extended discussion of the issue, see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays 
on Law and Morality (1979). 
22. This dilemma is explored in Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 53-95. 
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Psychologically, that some or many people may thus want to have their 
cake and eat it, too, should be anything but surprising. How, then, should 
the managers of our legal system respond? Should they care, and if so, how 
much? 
We have seen that law's regulation of conduct proceeds in two 
paradigmatic modes, guidance and enforcement, that respond to two 
distinguishable attitudes toward law, the internal and the external point of 
view. Consequently, the question becomes, how much effort should the 
state put into shaping conduct to conform to substantive legal norms by way 
of cultivating the internal point of view, and how much should it put into 
shaping conduct by way of enforcement? No legal system of any size can 
hope to bring citizens' conduct tolerably in line with primary legal norms 
relying exclusively on the threat of coercive sanctions, nor by relying 
exclusively on voluntary compliance by its citizens. One can then speak of 
optimization, reaching the optimal balance between these two efforts. 
Whatever the optimizing point, one thing is plain: Widespread 
intemalizatio:l of law's substantive norms reduces the state's enforcement 
costs necessary to attain any given level of compliance, and substantially 
so, if only because it multiplies dramatically the number of agents whose 
efforts maintain and reinforce the law's substantive norms of conduct. 
But that is not all. Perceptions of the law's substantive justice and 
procedural fairness are important causes of citizens' respect for the law and 
thus their adoption and maintenance of the internal point of view.23 
Consequently, a well-developed internal point of view becomes an 
important proxy for perceptions of substantive justice and procedural 
fairness, which in tum are important proxies (and sometimes determinative 
of) actuq.l substantive justice and procedural fairness. Of course, one may 
say that the implication, for those who administer legal systems, is that they 
should pursue justice and fairness, and allow the internal point of view to 
follow in train. Certainly they should pursue justice and fairness, but aside 
from the fact that proxies are sometimes more easily measured and targeted 
than the value for which they are proxies, this view would mistake the web 
of muhtally reinforcing forces at work. 
To see the point, imagine two societies roughly equivalent in all ways 
except that, in one, the level of compliance is maintained by twenty-five 
percent of the citizenry accepting the internal point of view, while in the 
other, the same level of compliance is maintained by seventy-five percent of 
the citizenry accepting the internal point of view. In particular, assume that 
the increased costs of the (nonenforcement) efforts to maintain 
23. See Tyler, supra note 5; see also Robert S. Summers, Form and Function in a Legal 
System-A General Study 284 (2006). Summers observes, 
I d. 
In tolerably well-ordered societies, a major factor that influences addressees 
voluntarily to act in accord with rules and other valid law is the general respect 
they have for the law . . . . [S]uch respect derives largely from the sense that 
addressees have that law is for the common good, that particular laws themselves 
are justified, and that the system oflaw and its manner of operation are acceptable. 
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internalization in the second society are exactly offset by the savings in 
enforcement costs, so that net governmental efforts and degree of citizen 
compliance with primary norms are the same in the two societies. Without 
regard to the justice of the substantive norms or the fairness of procedural 
norms, which by hypothesis are the same in the two societies, are they 
equally praiseworthy legal systems? I would say not. The latter is, qua 
legal system, healthier than the former. To what may we attribute this 
intuition? 
Return for a moment to the idea of a utopia of legality, one in which all 
citizens take the internal point of view toward the primary norms of 
conduct. As Lon Fuller illustrated, such a utopia of legality can be 
imagined, and the obstacles thereto can be analyzed, without assuming any 
particular form of government. His allegorical monarch, King Rex, faced a 
multitude of problems-such as lack of clarity, inconsistency, and 
retroactivity in promulgated norms-in his well-intentioned efforts to create 
even a minimal system of law for his undeniably law-respecting subjects.24 
This was an intentional conceit, because Fuller wanted to distinguish the 
morality of law from the morality of political organization. Fuller believed 
his arguments to be useful in assessing lawfulness in monarchies and 
dictatorships as well as democracies. But in assuming that King Rex's 
subjects took this internal point of view about law, Fuller was 
(intentionally) passing over the important matter of the causal relationships 
between political organization and the inclination of subjects to take the 
internal point of view. 
In a pure democracy, where the promulgators are the citizens themselves, 
it is relatively easy for citizens to regard legal norms that reflect the 
resolution of issues of principle or coordination from the internal point of 
view. To be sure, there is the possibility that those whose view does not 
prevail on an issue will lose the sense of self-governance and adopt the 
external point of view toward the promulgated law, especially if they are 
consistently on the losing side of debates about matters of principle. But 
the collective aspiration, in accepting or developing such a political system, 
is to achieve and maintain the internal point of view toward the legal 
system's solutions to those problems that require collective action. Under 
republican government, representation of the electorate by others opens up 
more authoritative distance between the law that is promulgated and the 
people governed by it, which makes it harder for the electorate to achieve 
and maintain the internal point of view. Still, as in a pure democracy, that 
is the aspiration. A sense of authorship becomes a wellspring of the 
internal point ofview.25 
24. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 33-38. 
_25 .. One can, of course, develop a theoretical account of legal authority and legal 
obhgatwn that does not necessarily depend on the idea of direct or indirect citizen 
authorship. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, at ch. 9 (1980). But that 
doe~ not gainsay the importance of such a sense of authorship in cultivating and maintaining 
the mternal point of view. 
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Fuller, however, perceived another, more subtle and thus more often 
neglected way in which citizens can have a connection with legal norms 
that cultivates and maintains the internal point of view. They can engage 
their cognitive faculties in the application of legal norms to themselves and 
others. They then make judgments about the lawfulness of their own acts 
and the acts of others. TJ:tis, of course, is si..'Tiply one manifestation of the 
fact that most substantive legal norms are intended to provide citizens with 
guidance. Although direct or indirect citizen authorship, together with the 
achievement of substantive justice and procedural fairness, rightly claim 
pride of place in cultivating and maintaining the internal point of view, the 
importance of the practice of self-application to a healthy legal system 
should not be underestimated. This form of participation augments the 
subjects' sense of "ownership" of (or "investment" in) the legal system 
itself and thus their commitment to it.26 By the practice of self-application, 
citizens cultivate an attitude of lawfulness that sustains and encourages 
responsible political participation, which in turn further contributes to the 
sense of authorship, and so on in a web of reciprocally reinforcing social 
attitudes and practices. 27 Even in the context of criminal prosecutions, 
where it makes most sense to say that the law often must simply "act upon" 
persons who have already acted by committing crimes, there remains an 
important value in engaging the accused in dialogue, premised on the idea 
that the accused can be made to understand that his actions violate the law, 
if that is so. 28 This, of course, presupposes that the accused can self-apply 
the law's norms, even if that requires the assistance of lawyers, juries, and 
judges after the fact. 
To return to my hypothetical pair of societies, one might well say that the 
second society, the one attaining a seventy-five percent internal point of 
view, will be subjectively happier just in the fact of the sense of ownership 
described, or more successful as a social group because of the greater 
commitment to a shared legality, or that these facts will generate dynamic 
effects, augmenting substantive justice or procedural fairness in the fullness 
of time. In these respects, the two societies are not identical, which would 
seem to violate my ceteris paribus assumption. On this point, I care not. 
Whether or not one monetizes (or "utilizes") the happiness, group 
successfulness, or future moral benefits associated with citizens' sense of 
self-government, my point is that optimizing enforcement costs does not tell 
26. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 190-216 (1986) (arguing that such a "protestant" 
idea of law helps to justify the law's claim to obedience). 
27. Jules Coleman put it nicely: 
The internal point of view, as expressed in public behaviour, creates and sustains a 
sense of reciprocity: that free riding or non-compliance is subject to public 
criticism, and so on. Stability, reciprocity, and mutuality of expectation are 
created and enhanced by the behaviour exhibited by those accepting a rule from 
the internal point of view. 
Jules Coleman, Inc01porationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in 
Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law 99, 120 (Jules Coleman 
ed., 2001). 
28. See R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 110-19 (1986). 
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the full story if it does not attend to the vanous implications of 
internalization beyond immediate compliance. 
Much modern theorizing about law has failed to recognize the full 
importance of maintaining and cultivating the internal point of view among 
the citizenry. The "bad man" theory oflegal obligation is perhaps the most 
conspicuous failure in this regard. When Holmes gave his famous "bad 
man" speech, "The Path of the Law," at Boston University School of Law, 
he was advising students on the best way to think of legal obligation and, 
therefore, the best way to advise clients.29 As already noted, this kind of 
recommendation has had profound effects on the legal profession. Yet, it is 
hardly the best way to preserve and cultivate the internal point of view 
among the citizenry to have lawyers advising clients by taking the external 
point of view. Although tangentially relevant in what follows, for the most 
part I shall leave this important issue to be addressed by others.30 
II. THE FORM OF LEGAL NORMS: RULES VERSUS STANDARDS 
The nexus between self-governance and· the internal point of view has 
important implications for the choice about the form of legal norms 
presented by the "rules versus standards" debate. The use of rules, I shall 
argue, tends to foster and maintain the internal point of view better than the 
use of standards. As a prelude to the arguments in that regard, this section 
briefly reviews now-conventional understanding of the choice between 
rules and standards. 
I will take as primitive the idea that "rules," as normative directives about 
conduct, are framed in terms of concepts that can be applied without 
explicit reference to the principles or policies that might have motivated the 
rule, usually by specifying operative facts that trigger the rule. Rule-based 
decision making takes this capacity seriously.31 Correspondingly, I take the 
use of standards to involve recourse to justificatory principles or policies, 
mediated by some form of balancing that does not specify in advance the 
result thereof. The important difference, then, between the rule-based and 
standard-based decision making, at least for present purposes, is that the 
former involves adjudication in accordance with norms that specify in 
advance, and with considerable definiteness, the results of the necessary 
balancing, whereas the latter involves adjudication in accordance with a 
29. See Holmes, supra note 1. 
30. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise 
in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545 (1995); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167 (2005). For a 
consideration of the problem in the context of an important area of practice, see Cynthia A. 
Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 
1265 (1998). 
31. See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991). 
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balancing of competing factors in the context of the particular case by some 
official after the occurrence of the events to which the standard is applied.32 
To be sure, a norm may be expressed in a way that looks like a rule, but 
in fact operates as a standard. For example, the simple negligence norm, 
"do not act unreasonably," appears rule-like, but the judgmental term 
"unreasonably" might signal a balancing approach, although it fails (at least 
on its face) to provide any factors that are to be considered in drawing the 
balance. 33 On the other hand, if this legal norm is applied iri a way that 
incorporates and makes controlling established social customs about what is 
and is not reasonable, then the legal norm operates as a rule after all, 
provided the established customs are adequately defrnite.34 For my 
purposes, I mean a norm to be most "rule-like" when it eliminates all 
normative judgment beyond the determination of operative adjudicative 
facts specified by the rule and those operative facts are not framed in terms 
that reintroduce an implicit, seriously controvertible, normative judgment. 
This obviously is an ideal conception to which most practical nonns can 
only aspire. 35 
As this last point suggests, and has been noted by others, we are dealing 
here with a spectrum of legal methodologies, ranging from the most rule-
governed decision making, using "pure" or "opaque" mles, that are applied 
without reference to underlying justifications, to the complete absence of 
nominal guidance for the citizen that appears in the creation of a cadi 
jurisdiction, in which an official is empowered simply to make the best 
decision for all concerned as to any dispute within the indicated jurisdiction 
that comes before that official. Between these extremes, one can find a 
variety of decision-making forms, including "presumptive" rule-based 
decision making (which accords significant but non-conclusive weight to 
following the authoritative rule), rule-sensitive particularism (which seeks 
to make the best decision all things considered, but where one of the things 
considered is the value of following rules), the use of rules of thumb (which 
employ a nominal mle to point to their underlying justifications, but 
otherwise acknowledge no independent reason to follow the stated rule), the 
employment of multi-factored tests coupled with announced goals to aid in 
reaching the proper balance of competing factors, the use of multi-factored 
32. See Hart, supra note 3, at 127-30; see also Kaplow, supra note 15, at 560 ("This 
Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinction between rules and 
standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or 
after individuals act.") 
33. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 27-28 (2000). 
34. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 64. This remains true even if the established customs are 
(or at some point in time were) established by performing a cost-benefit analysis or other 
form of balancing, so long as the application of the negligence norm is not the occasion for a 
fresh consideration of the competing factors. 
35. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 33-34 (emphasizing the contingent 
relationship between factual form and determinateness). 
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tests without an articulated goal, and so forth.36 To simplify the discussion, 
I will refer generically to rules versus standards, or to rule-based versus 
standard-based decision making, and draw a variety of contrasts that, if 
necessary, could be translated for greater precision into the more 
cumbersome language of a spectrum. No claim I make depends on a strict 
categorical distinction. 
I pass over the question of whether governance by rule is truly possible, 
that is, whether rule-based decision making is, in theory or in practice, 
distinguishable from standard-based decision making. I accept without 
argument that there is a theoretical and often a practical difference between 
the two, that the former does not inevitably reduce to the latter.37 And this 
is so despite the familiar facts that norms adopted as standards can become 
rules as a consequence of the operation of the doctrine of precedent38 and 
that, conversely, norms adopted as rules can become standards by the 
(perhaps pernicious) operation of the doctrine of precedent. 39 
Granted these subtleties, long familiar arguments have centered on the 
conflicting virtues of the "fair notice" function of rules and the tailored 
justice possible under standards.40 More recent com.tnentary has focused on 
the question of relative institutional competency and role differentiation. 
Rules are understood to be crude instruments, almost inevitably over- and 
under-inclusive relative to their underlying justifications, so that application 
of the rule without recourse to those justifications predictably leads to 
"justificatory errors," that is, decisions at variance with the result dictated 
by a full and accurate consideration of all justificatory factors.41 Rules are 
nonetheless considered desirable when the lawmaking authorities, 
particularly legislatures and appellate courts, are sufficiently better able to 
draw the balance of competing considerations, even when addressing a 
relatively broad class of cases, such that a net increase in such errors would 
·result from lower officials' attempts to engage in "all things considered" 
particularized assessments in individual cases.42 
36. Most of these are summarized in a useful article: Frederick Schauer, Rules and the 
Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 645,647-51 (1991). 
37. For arguments supporting this assumption, see id. at 657-63, 665-79. 
38. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 577-79. Even more obviously, a statute that 
promulgates a standard for conduct may be converted into a rule by the delegated authority 
of an agency to promulgate rules that give effect to the legislative standard. See Hart, supra 
note 3, at 127-28. For present purposes, such a norm is considered a rule, because our 
interest resides in the behavior of the persons whose conduct is regulated, not the intra-
governmental relation between legislature and agency. 
. 39. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 26-27 (noting the potential effect of the creation of 
mdefmite exceptions to a rule). 
40. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1694-1701 (discussing these and other 
considerations). 
41. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 31-34. In principle, and to a limited extent in 
practice, a rule can be made increasingly complex so that over- and under-inclusion are 
reduced. See id. at 155-56; Kaplow, supra note 15, at 586-96. Such "complexification," 
however, carries with it many (though not all) of the difficulties associated with standards. 
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for A Complex World (1995). 
42. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 685-86. 
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Conventional law and economics analysis has enriched this picture in 
several ways. For example, it highlights administrative costs, with the 
result that front-loading the administrative costs associated with rule-based 
decision making will tend to be optimal, ceteris paribus, in contexts where 
much of the same kind of dispute recurs frequently. The back-loaded costs 
of standards-based decision maki11g will tend, ceteris paribus, to be optimal 
when factual heterogeneity across a class of regulated activity, including 
variation over time, makes particularized norm adaptation useful.43 More 
important for our purposes, economic analysts have encouraged us to 
emphasize the effect of the choice between rules and standards on the 
behavior of citizens governed by the norms. This extends not only to the 
behavior of individuals whose relationship is governed by rules or standards 
(what I will call the "interactional" context), but also to the context in which 
one or both of those individuals considers transferring the entitlement 
governed by the rule or standard to another (what I will call the 
"transactional" context). 
I will make reference to the prevailing wisdom on these matters in what 
follows, but for the moment suffice it to say that no general preference for 
rules or standards seems to have emerged from such analyses. Surveying 
the literature, Russell Korobkin has concluded interestingly that no meta-
rule emerges from the conventional law and economics analysis, only a set 
of factors that generate a meta-standard to be applied to each context in 
which the choice of rules or standards is to be made.44 Korobkin goes on to 
argue that even a more nuanced behavioral analysis, with attention to the 
\Vays that people do not act as rational economic maximizers, fails to yield 
a clear preference for rules or for standards.45 
My thesis is that we can say something more definite than this, once the 
contingent, but nonetheless clearly identifiable, facts of our common reality 
and our aspirations to self-government are taken into account. 
III. RULES, STANDARDS, AND SELF-GOVERNANCE: A FIRST LOOK 
The use of standards can be criticized as involving inherent delegation of 
lawmaking authority to the decision maker employing the standard-that is, 
mostly judges, particularly trial judges. Like all delegations of lawmaking 
authority, this is viewed skeptically by those who consider legislatures the 
more democratically responsible authorities.46 This idea borders on what I 
43. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 15, at 585. 
44. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 42-43. 
45. ld. at 58. This agnosticism or ambivalence is not limited to those who approach the 
I 
I 
~ 
! 
question from the perspective of law and economics. Not surprisingly, critical legal theorists " 
have concluded that the appropriate policy choice is even more starkly indeterminate. See 1 
Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 15-63 (1987). 
46. Representative of this view is the jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia. See, e.g., ll 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176 (1989). 
To be sure, Scalia's main concern in that article was the relationship between appellate 
courts and lower courts, to which the democratic accountability issue becomes less salient, (. 
as he recognized. !d. at 1176-77. Scalia's further arguments attempt to justify his resistance 
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want to discuss, but I am not concerned here with the question of 
democratic accountability as a matter of moral philosophy. Instead, I want 
to focus on the effects of the choice of modality on the attitude of the 
citizenry as it encounters legal norms that may apply to the citizens' 
conduct. 
There are two ways that the use of standards complicates and, under 
plausible empirical assumptions, attenuates the sense of self-governance. 
First, in rough parallel with the accountability argument, delegation of 
lawmaking authority to lower level officials creates unnecessary distance 
between the elected authors of law and the law as actually applied and, 
therefore, between the electors and the law as actually applied. This 
arguably dilutes the electorate's sense of authorship of the laws it 
encounters, which in tum may have a detrimental effect on citizens' ability 
to take the internal view toward law. While there is probably some truth in 
this claim, it is difficult to imagine that the degree of acceptance of an 
internal point of view toward law's norms among the citizenry in any 
sizeable modem society is significantly affected by the fact that the norms 
are articulated with specificity by elected representatives, themselves fairly 
distant from the citizenry, rather than officials to whom those elected 
officials delegate, with greater or lesser guidance, the responsibility to 
fashion the norms. 
The second phenomenon is somewhat more subtle but, I believe, 
ultimately more significant. It concerns not the citizen's cmmection to the 
making oflaw, but rather the citizen's connection to the application of law. 
Interestingly, when one focuses on application, it would seem that using 
standards would be more compatible (than using rules) with the self-
governance that is our republican aspiration. After all, a person to whom 
the standard is addressed, by being required to engage the assessment of 
principles and policies and the balance of competing considerations, 
participates in the law-applying process. Such participation should 
contribute to a sense of self-governance, even if the subject does not feel 
close to the process of the standard's authorship. To the extent that the 
application of general standards involves delegated lawmaking activity, the 
subject participates in that activity at the very point of its application. 
But any general preference for standards would entail serious problems. 
By effectively delegating much of the lawmaking functions to the citizenry, 
promulgators of standards to that extent abandon the task for which law-
abiding citizens have need of law. The more standard-like a norm is, the 
more it fails to give guidance to citizens about the resolution of those 
conflicts and disagreements that citizens need resolved by law; at least it 
fails to do so at the moments of action when they need such matters 
to b~lancing tests and discretion (i.e., standards) and his preference for rules, a preference 
that IS reflected in his judicial opinions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931-
33 (1997). 
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resolved.47 Arguably, widespread use of standards undermines the 
reciprocity between government and the governed that is an important 
moral foundation of both the duty of obedience and the right to rule.48 Of 
course, just as citizens may have no difficulty refusing to abide by law's 
resolutions, despite an arguable moral obligation of obedience, so too the 
promulgators of law may fail to honor an arguably reciprocal commitment 
to resolve such issues definitely. They may cite the administrative costs of 
developing sound rules, for example. And they might be right-that is, any 
particular choice of a standard might not simply be a pretext for avoiding 
the hard work of formulating good rules. Nevertheless, a variety of 
practical counterarguments, ones that may have stronger appeal to 
lawmakers than the moral reciprocity argument, give further support for a 
preference for rules. The following sections lay out these 
counterarguments. 
IV. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: THE INTERACTIONAL CONTEXT 
I begin with the assumption-which will be relaxed in Part VI-that all 
citizens involved are inclined to take the internal point of view, if it is 
possible for them to do so. With that assumption, I address first 
interactional contexts, those in which citizens choose conduct in light of 
existing entitlements; no transfer (including contractual modification) of the 
entitlement is involved-because such transfers are prohibited, because 
transaction costs are too high for such a transfer to occur, or because there 
simply is no interest on the part of the parties in making such a transfer. 
Here is to be found much of the law of torts and crimes, including the vast 
array of regulatory offenses. 
When given a rule, a citizen inclined to follow the rule can attempt to 
apply it to his or her own circumstances. If the question of enforcement 
comes up, the citizen can, and usually will, predict enforcement based on 
his or her own application of the rule. For example, given a specific speed 
limit on a particular road, the citizen will predict being stopped for speeding 
based mostly on her own assessment of whether or not she exceeds that 
speed limit.49 Obligation is perceived first, enforcement is predicted 
second. In contrast, when given a standard, when told for example to drive 
no faster than is reasonably safe under the conditions or to balance 
competing needs for safety and rapid transportation, a citizen will quickly 
47. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 28-32. PersonifYing law as the law-
giver, "Lex," Alexander and Sherwin state the matter succinctly: "[I]f uncertainty and 
disagreement about how moral principles apply in concrete situations are what give rise to 
the need for Lex and Lex's rules, Lex's rules are responsive to this need only if they 
themselves do not engender uncertainty and disagreement about their concrete applications." 
!d. at 32-33. 
48. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 38-41. 
49. As this particular example suggests, the citizen may have to make allowances for a 
pattern of partial nonenforcement, and this itself may generate some of the same problems 
associated with standards. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1395 (2002). 
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understand that the balance is a matter of opinion and, therefore, will tend 
to assess obligation by way of prediction; the citizen will look to the 
authority whose opinion about the appropriate balance will be controlling in 
terms of legal consequences. In this way, prediction will precede 
obligation.50 As compared to rules, this encourages the citizen to take the 
external point of view. Reinforcing this tendency is the differential 
disappointment and frustration that the citizen will feel if it is lesli likely 
that his own assessment of the balance under a standard will match the 
balance struck by officials than that his own application of a rule will match 
official application of the rule. The following paragraphs explore why such 
an increased interpretational gap can be expected. 
As already noted, one of the important reasons that lawmakers have 
recourse to rules is that the application of standards by inferior officials-
trial courts, agency administrators, prosecutors-can produce judgments 
regarding the balance of competing considerations that do not match closely 
enough the balance that would be determined by the law's promulgators-
legislatures or appellate courts, as the case may be. But by pinning down 
inferior officials, promulgators also create greater predictabilit-y from the 
point of view of those citizens whose conduct is to be governed. 5 1 While 
the gap between authorship and application by officials is not unimportant 
in terms of the incidence of justificatory errors, the potential for a gap 
between the applying officials and the law's subjects is more important in 
regard to citizens' sense of self-govenunent. 
First, the officials who make and apply law are generally drawn from a 
class of people-lawyers-who tend to share social, educational, and 
vocational experiences, a shared background that can be expected to 
generate greater homogeneity of response to the problem of applying the 
balancing tests, or other forms of discretion, that characterize standards. In 
contrast, the overwhelming majority of citizens do not generally share that 
professional culture, which will cause a gap between citizen and official 
application of standards. 52 Such mismatches lead to disappointment and 
50. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 23-24 (1985) ("Mechanical rules ... are predictable and 
relatively inexpensive to apply: generally speaking, they can be applied by laymen with 
little or no input from lawyers or judges. . . . In contrast, judgmental rules . . . are 
unpredictable and relatively expensive to apply. Judgmental rules require a large input of 
legal advice and possibly even a judicial trial (or legislative or administrative action) before 
the assignment of property rights can be established."); see also id. at 19 n.28 (noting that 
what Merrill calls "judgmental rules" are often referred to as standards). 
51. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 13 7-45 (discussing the value of rules in protecting 
citizens' reliance interest). 
52. See Korob!cin, supra note 33, at 34-35, 37, 48-49. The problem can be ameliorated 
to some extent by the employment of lay juries when standards must be applied. The use of 
lay juries supports the internal point of view among the citizenry in at least two ways: (1) 
!ury judgment helps to reduce the gap between legal judgment and lay expectations, and (2) 
J~r.or participation in retail law-articulation and law-application helps to maintain juror-
Citizen connection to the law. 
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frustration when citizens fmd their disparate ex ante assessments fail to 
mesh with the ex post assessments of the courts. 53 
Additional sources of disappointment and frustration arise from 
pervasive bias of various kincl!':. The law's subjects generally flnd 
themselves in situations where their self-interest will exert a powerful 
clouding influence on their judgments, even if they are acting in good 
faith-that is, even when they are attempting to maintain the internal point 
of view toward the law's norms. This self-interest can and will be given 
greater play in the context of the uncertainties in the application of 
standards. 54 At the same time, adjudicators who are called upon to apply 
legal norms after the fact are subject to their own sources of bias that have a 
freer play in the context of standards. Personal or political agendas can 
come into play when officials encounter the particularities of a case 
governed by a standard, and this is true even if they accept the internal point 
of view toward the standard to be applied. 55 Beyond that, a more specific 
cognitive form of bias can be expected. An adjudicator's assessment of the 
approp1iate balance of competing factors under a standard is made in the 
context of knowing the consequences of actions that, to the actors, were 
tmcertain ex ante. This "hindsight bias" will, for example, amplify the 
difference between an actor's self-interested prediction of low risk and the 
court's ex post assessment of the risk of an action that is now lmown to 
have caused harm. 56 
The use of rules does not entirely eliminate the potential for mismatches 
between the citizen's legal judgment and that of officials. But as compared 
to governance by rules, the three factors identified can be expected to 
increase substantially the number of such mismatches when citizens 
encounter standards. Adding insult to injury, such mismatches will occur 
53. The exceptional situation often noted is one in which the legal norm employs or 
incorporates by reference a standard that has independent social meaning, such as a business 
or social custom. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, C!ystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. 
Rev. 577, 609 (1988) (discussing efficiency of a standard of"commercial reasonableness"). 
Rose's discussion presents what I have called a transactional context, concerning 
transactions between merchants governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, but one can 
imagine business custom being invoked, say, in a nuisance suit. As already noted, however, 
the more factually specific or otherwise determinate such a custom is, the more rule-like 
becomes the legal norm that incorporates it, in which case the situation is not in truth 
exceptional. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
54. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 46. Risk aversion in contemplation of an uncertain 
official judgment seems to cut the other way, inducing citizens to make a conservative 
assessment of the scope of their entitlements, but there is no reason to think that risk 
aversion offsets bias in each citizen, and for those in which bias and risk aversion are both at 
work, there is no reason to think that the two effects roughly cancel each other. Cf id. at 37-
38. 
55. !d. at 38-39. 
56. !d. at 47-49. Like most heuristics, hindsight bias does not necessarily reflect an 
irrational adaptation to the environment; it all depends on context. See Ulrich Hoffrage & 
Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias: A Price Worth Paying for Fast and Frugal Mem01y, in 
Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart 191 (1999). But in the 
context of adjudication, hindsight bias can present significant problems. See Mitu Gulati et 
al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004). 
2006] 
despite 
assess1 
advant: 
.].,,. h<>l 
Ll.l.\..1 Vc..4."" 
on eac 
can be 
view, 
behavi 
will tr: 
to tak 
valued 
justifi< 
of stm 
affect, 
Nat 
that c: 
optior 
encou 
pay f, 
situati 
with 
acqua 
are hi 
their 
Many 
go w 
legal 
Ev 
repre 
in ten 
an e-x 
but i1 
appli 
cont< 
more 
balm 
lawy 
rathe 
offic 
co he 
laW) 
5" 
argur 
5: 
101, 
5' 
I 
( 
1 
l 
2006] RULES, STAl'iDARDS 1303 
despite the greater time and effort that citizens must put into the task of 
assessing the import of law's norms for their conduct, for one of the 
advantages of rules is the time and energy saved by not having to conduct 
the balancing of competing considerations at retail, that is, by each citizen 
on each occasion presented. 57 Such disappointment and frustration, in tum, 
can be expected to undennine citizens' commitment to the internal point of 
view, driving citizens to take a more predictive viewpoint toward the 
behavior of officials. In the extreme, there is the risk that respect for law 
will transmute into manipulative supplication of officials, as citizens begin 
to take actions that signal to the state that they possess characteristics 
valued by officials, even when such characteristics do not relate to the 
justifications of the particular legal norm. Especially under the flexibility 
of standards, such characteristics might affect, and might be expected to 
affect, official decision making. 58 
Naturally, one must consider the potential to obtain help from lawyers 
that can address these problems. For a variety of reasons, however, this 
option will do little to dampen the indicated corrosive process that standards 
encourage. Most significantly, a great many people are willing and able to 
pay for legal assistance only in the most unusual of contexts; for other 
situations, they will rely on their own assessment of the law's demands, 
with the possible help of the word-of-mouth advice of mostly lay 
acquaintances. Further, the costs of obtaining professional legal assistance 
are higher in the context of standards, because lawyers must engage more of 
their own energies in replicating the potential judgment of adjudicators. 
Many citizens-more than when working with rules-will simply choose to 
go without such assistance, at least until after crucial decisions that entail 
legal commitments are made. 59 
Even when, often after the fact when risks have matured into harms, legal 
representation is seen as a practical option or necessity, the intense self-
interest that warrants the costs of representation will push the citizen toward 
an external point of view. This is true whatever form the law's norms take, 
but it is, I suggest, more dramatically so when lawyers are working with the 
application of standards rather than the interpretation of rules. In the 
context of standards, lawyers themselves can hardly avoid being driven 
more toward a predictive standpoint, lest their assessment of the required 
balance diverge from that of the judiciary. After all, clients do not consult 
lawyers to get the lawyer's assessment of the competing considerations, but 
rather to close the gap between the client's assessment and that of 
officialdom, especially the judiciary. And although it is theoretically 
coherent to imagine subjects taking the internal point of view toward their 
lawyer's predictive assessment of judicial judgment, it is much more 
57. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 145-49 (discussing such a cognitive "efficiency" 
argument for governance by rules). 
58. See Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Nonns, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
101, 113-16 (1997) (noting the danger to the value of autonomy). 
59. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 562-64, 569. 
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plausible that clients will take the predictive attitude the next step: 
predicting the exercise of state power. 
Despite the increased costs of legal advice, the employment of standards 
rather than mles expands the range of legal questions for which the 
assistance of lawyers and, ultimately, litigation are cost-effective, at least 
for the relatively affluent. Tlus drives up legal costs and increases the 
frequency of the circumstances that, as argued in the previous paragraph, 
will tend to undermine the internal point of view among the general 
citizenry.60 This may serve the class interests of the legal profession, but it 
disserves the interests of the citizenry.61 Because of the association of the 
legal profession with the law, this can be expected to do more than 
undermine commitment to law; it will tend to create overt hostility toward 
it.62 
In the final analysis, there is little exaggeration in Hayek's observation: 
The understanding that 'good fences make good neighbors', that is, 
that men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their own ends 
without colliding with each other only if clear boundaries can be drawn 
between their respective domains of free action, is the basis on which all 
known civilization has grown. 63 
Using rules thus encourages citizens to take the law into account in 
choosing action, not only because they need to do so in order to achieve 
their goals but because they can do so, at least they can do so more easily 
than when standards are employed. And this fact can be expected to help 
maintain and foster the internal point of view. 64 
60. Perverse as it may seem, at least until the Holmes ian bad man theory of law becomes 
less influential among lawyers, one of the most important ways to preserve the internal point 
of view among the citizenry may be to reduce the frequency with which they feel compelled 
to seek legal representation. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
61. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 47, observing that 
[g]enera!ly speaking, laymen tend to prefer mechanical rules, even if they seem 
silly or inefficient, whereas spokesmen for the legal community-including 
leading academics and judges-tend to prefer judgmental rules [i.e., standards]. 
This is as one would predict, assuming that laymen prefer private solutions to 
resource disputes that minimize the demand for lawyers and litigation, whereas the 
legal community prefers collective solutions that increase the demand. 
See also Kaplow, supra note 15; at 620. 
62. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 1-17, 25 (connecting public frustration with law and 
lawyers to increasing legal complexity, of which the uncertainty associated with standards is 
an important component). 
63. 1 Hayek, supra note 7, at 107 (footnote omitted). 
64. See Summers, supra note 23, at 156 ("Well-drawn definiteness furthers the rule of 
law, especially in giving addressees fair notice of the law's requirements, in facilitating ease 
and accuracy of application of law, and in securing like treatment of like cases. Other things 
equal, definiteness also tends to render an otherwise well-designed law more respectworthy, 
too."). 
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V. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: THE TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT 
When we shift focus from the interactional to the transactional context, 
but retain the tentative assumption that all persons involved are inclined to 
take the internal point of view, the balance of considerations still favors 
rules. Conventional law and economics analysis recognizes that the clarity 
of entitlements affects transaction costs: the clearer the entitlement, the 
lower the transaction cost and the easier it is to make transfers. 65 This is 
good, whether one views such transfers as serving autonomous choice or as 
facilitating efficiency in the allocation of entitlements. Equally important 
from our present perspective, being better able to achieve one's goals in 
transactional contexts, however those goals are defmed, should better 
reinforce citizens' commitment to law.66 
Nonetheless, it is generally understood that the use of standards might 
contribute to efficient allocations in certain situations. The core insight is 
that, in situations where consensual reallocation of entitlements to more 
efficient users cannot occur, due to high transaction costs or strategic 
bargaining behavior ("hold-outs"), then standards permit adjudicators to 
assign the entitlement to the most efficient user ex post, when details that 
affect the efficient allocation are more knowable, or induce parties to 
abandon strategic bargaining and consummate efficient transfers.67 It is 
believed that the same result will accrue from a rule only if the rule 
fortunately, if fortuitously, assigns the entitlement ex ante to the party who 
will end up being able to make the most efficient use of it. But these 
suggestions represent decidedly second-order phenomena, because the 
conditions under which standards will work in this way are quite 
demanding, and there is little reason to believe that lawmakers are capable 
of segregating contexts in which standards will be more efficient from those 
generally more common situations in which they will not, 68 and little more 
reason to believe that law-applying officials have the competence to make 
efficient ex post choices under standards.69 Nor is it likely that the 
65. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 93, 97 (4th ed. 2004). 
66. See generally 1 Hayek, supra note 7 (explaining that citizens' commitment to 
conceptions of justice are shaped by the evolution of abstract and predictable norms that 
facilitate the achievement of citizens' diverse purposes). 
67. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 256 (1995) (modeling conditions under which standards will negate potential 
hold-out behavior by less efficient users); Merrill, supra note 50 (explaining the usefulness 
of standards in high transaction cost contexts). 
68. For example, Jason Johnston conditions his result favoring standards on at least the 
~allowing assumptions: (a) The potential acquirer of a right to act has incomplete 
mfonnation about the harm of his actions; (b) the potential efficiency gains of preventing a 
hold-out are large; and (c) adjudicators systematically underestimate high levels of harm to 
the person holding out. See Johnston, supra note 67, at 257-58. Note that, in order for the 
standard to work efficiently, lawmakers choosing a standard must either be very lucky or 
they must know, inter alia, that in the chosen context, courts systematically underestimate 
levels of harm and yet they (lawmakers and adjudicators) must be unwilling or unable to 
change that. 
69. See Korobldn, supra note 33, at 38-39. 
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occasional efficiency gains, if any, from creating ex ante uncertainty by 
using standards would be worth the more pervasive impairment of the 
ownership clarity that is so important in providing incentives to conserve 
and develop resources optimally. 70 
More importantly, from the present perspective, in these potentially 
identifiable contexts in which standards might be employed to achieve local 
efficiency gains, it is tmlikely that the relative efficiency losses that might 
occur under rules because transfers do not take place will be viewed by the 
citizenry as an evil attributable to the law itself; instead, they will be 
attributed to the unusually high transaction costs or strategic bargaining. 
This means that the efficiency losses associated with rules pose no serious 
threat to the maintenance of respect for law. 71 By contrast, inefficient 
allocations by a court that erroneously applies a standard will very likely be 
attributed by the affected citizens to legal failure. 
These points are illustrated in the context of one particular kind of 
impediment to transfers that has emerged in recent work on behavioral law 
and economics: the endowment effect. Experimental research has shown 
that (at least for some people in some contexts) the lowest price at which 
the individual will sell an entitlement he owns is higher than the highest 
price at which he will purchase that same entitlement from another. 72 With 
regard to the choice between rules and standards, the argument is that this 
supposedly inational behavior suppresses transfers of entitlements and that 
the increased clarity of entitlement associated with rules increases the 
frequency or severity of the endowment effect_73 
There are substantial difficulties for this argument. It fails to distinguish 
between the question of whether one is assigned an entitlement (which 
plausibly determines the endowment effect) and the question of whether 
one's entitlement is defmed or protected by way of a rule or a standard 
(which may not). Even if the choice of rule or standard affects the 
entitlement holder's minimum sale price and maximum purchase price, it is 
not clear that it affects the difference between the two for any given.person, 
70. See, e.g., Jolmston, supra note 67, at 273 (acknowledging the countervailing 
importance of protecting incentives to invest in the object of the entitlement and the 
relevance of clarity of ownership thereto). In a parallel fashion, the importance of such 
incentive effects undermines the occasional arguments in favor of liability rules over 
property rules. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability RLt!es, Once Again, 2 
Rev. L. & Econ. 137 (2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 073&context=rle; Henry E. Smith, 
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004). 
71. The exception would occur when some separate legal norm is the source of the high 
transaction costs (as, indeed, can be the case when a standard is chosen), in which case the 
better strategy for the law would generally be to eliminate that impediment. Of course, there 
may be good reasons not to let people achieve their goals (at least their immediate goals) by 
alienating certain of their interests. If these inalienability norms are well considered and 
have broad appeal, they should not undermine the internal point of view just because they 
are constraints. 
72. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman eta!., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990). 
73. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 51-53. 
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which is what drives the endowment effect. In any event, even if the choice 
does affect this difference, the argument fails to the extent that transfers are 
valued because they effectuate autonomy rather than because they facilitate 
efficiency. Neither party's autonomy is impaired just because they choose 
not to make a transfer that would, unbeknownst to either of them, increase 
their joint wealth. For the same reason, the failure of such transfers should 
have little negative effect on citizens' inclination to take the internal point 
of view. 
Moreover, relative to the efficiency consideration (and more indirect 
impacts it might have on citizens' attitudes toward law), it is important to 
note that the endowment effect discourages transfer only under special 
conditions that happen sporadically. For example, if Sa is the minimal sale 
price for an entitlement when held by A, and P a is the maximum purchase 
price that A will pay for that entitlement, with sin1i1ar definitions for B (Sb 
and Pb), then the endowment effect (Sa>Pa; Sb>Pb) will prevent efficient 
transfer from B to A (because Sb>Pa) when Sa>Sb>Pa>Pb or Sa>Sb>Pb>Pa, 
but not when Sa>Pa>Sb>Pb. Even on pure efficiency grounds, attempting to 
eliminate such second-order, quite possibly transient, 74 endowment effects 
by clouding the question of entitlement impairs the ability of owners to 
cultivate the objects of the entitlements and plan for their use in a world of 
changing information. 
So far in this section I have been discussing whether the problems of 
transfer affect the choice between rules or standards for interactional 
dimensions of the entitlement subject to potential transfer. A slightly 
different set of considerations is present when addressing instead the 
question of whether the legal norms governing transfer should themselves 
be articulated as rules or standards. Here again, the conventional result is 
that entitlement clarity, such as that provided by rules, reduces transfer 
transaction costs and thus contributes to the achievement of private 
purposes and the efficient allocation of entitlements.75 And once again, this 
can be expected to foster the internal point of view. To be sure, even if 
standards control transfers, so long as such standards are waivable default 
rules, there is no loss of party satisfaction or efficiency in contexts where 
the stakes are high enough and the parties are sophisticated enough to 
negotiate desired adjustments in the default rules.76 But in other contexts, 
~~-- The endowment effect may be only temporarily an obstacle to efficient transfer, if 
~onSJt!Ons or parties shift so that the quantitative relationships change, for example, from 
.> 7b>P.>Pb to S.>P.>Sb>Pb or (involving a third person) to Sc>Pc>Sb>Pb. T :~See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertaintv, and the 
;-ans·:r- of Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal 
oun atzonforExchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985). 
th 76· Such default or "gap filling" provisions are in an important way quite different from 
coe ~andatory rules that are the main topic of this essay. Gap filling norms are efforts to ag~p ete the contract of the parties, and will often entail some notion of hypothetical mo~~ment. See, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 65, at 211-17. If the parties are able to stan~JY a default standard but choose not to do so, or if they choose to adopt a contractual 
on th ard to govern their relationship, it is reasonable to infer that they prefer to be governed 
e matter by a standard. For a helpful analysis of some of the complexities involved for 
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or when transfer standards are non-waivable, standards will produce the 
~>ame tendency toward predictivism and the same potential for 
disappointment and frustration previously discussed. 77 Promulgators of law 
will have a difficult task distinguishing effectively among these contexts, 
although the possibility of successfully doing so cannot be ruled out. 
One response to this kind of critique of standards is to suggest that 
transacting parties will be able to insure against the increased risk of 
mismatch between their own assessments ex ante and those of officials ex 
post.78 We may grant this, especially for sophisticated parties. But that 
does not mean the law should ignore the opportunity to avoid causing such 
insecurity. This is especially true in the present context, because relegating 
citizens to insuring against unpredictable legal outcomes conduces to, if not 
effectively endorses, the external point of view. When citizens come to see 
legal outcomes on known or hypothesized facts as phenomena only to be 
handled actuarially, like floods or automobile accidents, they lose the 
connection that constitutes the internal point of view; they are then engaged 
merely in risk management. 79 
All in all, when behavioral and circumstantial realities are incorporated 
into a comparative analysis of rules and standards, a fairly strong case for 
rules emerges, warranting a default preference for rules in regulating the 
conduct of citizens who are inclined to take the intemal point of view. In 
most contexts, the factors that generate this preference-the cultural gap 
between citizen and legal elites, expensive and risky legal redress, 
predictable bias of various forms-are likely more important quantitatively 
and qualitatively than considerations, such as differential administrative 
costs, that would incline lawmakers to choose standards. Such a default 
preference helps to remind lawmakers not to overweight the immediately 
pressing administrative costs of promulgating rules, or the potential ex post 
efficiency gains possible if a court acts competently and with social wealth 
in mind, by excessively discounting the complex web of indirect, delayed, 
and largely "off budget" social costs associated with standards. 
contracting parties, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006). In such contexts, whether or not the parties' ex 
ante confidence in courts is well placed, it is less likely that parties' frustration with the 
resulting uncertainty will be focused on the law than would be the case if the law imposes a 
standard on the parties. 
77. For example, the doctrine excusing performance of contracts on grounds of 
"impracticability" has generated remarkable uncertainty despite efforts to predict the 
behavior of courts: 
In spite of attempts by all of the contract scholars . . . it remains impossible to 
predict with accuracy how the [impracticability doctrine] will apply to a variety of 
relatively common cases. Both the cases and the Code commentary are full of 
weasel words such as "severe" shortage, "marked" increase, "basic" assumptions, 
and "force majeure." 
1 James J. White & RobertS. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 3-10 (4th ed. 1995). 
78. See Kelman, supra note 45, at 43. 
79. See Nance, supra note 6, at 878-79 (discussing the radical separation of social 
epistemology between manager and political community when a manager adopts the "law as 
price" model derived from Holmes's bad man theory). 
,r 
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VI. INDIFFERENCE, OPPORTUNISM, AND THE EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW 
Until now, we have assumed that the parties involved have taken the 
internal point of view, or at least were inclined to do so. Whatever the 
motivating psychology, we have assumed this to involve good faith effort-
not always effective, of course-to comply with the legal norm, whether 
rule or standard, or at least to take that norm seriously as a (defeasible) 
reason for action. Two important issues remain to be addressed. One is to 
assess the impact of the existence of those who are indifferent to the law's 
messages, at least until they find themselves caught up in the snare of 
litigation or prosecution. The second concerns the problem of opportunistic 
behavior, which is connected to the existence of those who take the external 
point of view. 
The first issue need not detain us for long. There will likely always be 
some citizens who, for want of knowledge of or interest in the applicable 
legal norms, pay no attention at all to such norms-whether rules or 
standards-in determining their conduct, at least in certain spheres. 80 If 
interactions among such citizens could be practically segregated, the choice 
between rules and standards for those interactions might fall back to the 
more agnostic, meta-standard framework described earlier. It is, however, 
generally quite difficult, if not impossible, to tailor norms to distinguish 
between such classes of citizens or between the contexts in which a citizen 
will attend to the law and those in which she will not. Complications 
include the fact that some such individuals take their behavioral cues from 
social custom that is itself shaped by other people's expectations about the 
law, so that individuals who pay no direct attention to the law may 
nonetheless be guided in their actions by it. In the end, the advantages of 
rules should not be neglected because of the possible existence of a class of 
consistently or intermittently law-ignoring citizens. Law aspires to reduce 
their number, and rules are more conducive to that end. 
The second issue is more subtle. It has been argued that the relatively 
bright lines that characterize rules provide people with information about 
just how far they can go without incurring legal sanctions, often in defiance 
of the purposes underlying the rule and sometimes lmowingly taking 
advantage of the rule's over- or under-inclusiveness. 81 To some extent, this 
kind of opportunism is possible for both the good and the bad person, in the 
technical senses we have been using for these terms. While good persons 
take the legal rule as guidance, some may still feel entitled to "walk the 
80. "Many men go on about their business with virtually no lmowledge of, or attention 
paid to, the so-called legal rules, be those rules certain or uncertain." Jerome Frank, Law and 
th~ Modem Mind 35 (1936). Of course, Frank greatly exaggerates the significance of this 
pomt, first by escalating his claim to one about "most men," and then by arguing from the 
unstated premise that nearly all men ignore the law to reach the extraordinary conclusion 
that "uncertainty in law has little bearing on practical affairs." Id. Few conclusions about 
law are more profoundly mistaken. 
81. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1695-96. The possibility of this kind of opportunism 
;?~Y .encourage people willing to engage in it to expend resources looking for potential 
VJchms." See Rose, supra note 53, at 599-601. 
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line" in this fashion, although they will be less concerned with the question 
of legal sanctions than with the terms of the rule violation of which might 
trigger such sanctions. On the other hand, because they accept and 
voluntarily cooperate in maintaining the rules, those who take the internal 
point of view are more likely to understand rules purposively, which 
presents the potential for interpreting the rule so as to violate neither its 
letter nor its spirit. In contrast, the person who takes the external point of 
view, who attends to legal rules only as signals or predictions that coercive 
sanctions might be applied, is more likely to ignore a purposive 
understanding of rules as well as any moral inhibitions about using 
information about legal rules (including how and when they are likely to be 
enforced) to fullest advantage. So the problem of opportunism is 
particularly acute in regard to the Holmesian bad man. The inference that 
can be drawn from this collection of observations is that the flexibility 
provided by standards can allow adjudicators to identify and sanction those 
people who would thus act opportunistically, thereby protecting those who 
encounter them in either the interactional or transactional context. This 
flexibility, in tum, creates risk that will help deter people from such 
contemplated opportunism. 82 
There is certainly some truth in such arguments, but they mistake a tree 
for the forest. The tree is that small set of encounters between citizens that 
result in adjudication, the event that presents the opportunity for 
adjudicators to achieve tailored fairness and to control the opportunistic 
behavior described. Although, as noted above, it is likely that the use of 
standards increases litigation, at least when stakes are high and parties are 
relatively resourceful, we are stili talking about a small fraction of the forest 
of potentially litigated events. Focusing, instead, on that large set of cases 
in which the parties are unlikely to seek legal advice, much less the 
intervention of courts, the comparative advantage assessment is entirely 
reversed. Citizens are more likely to be aware of and to comprehend the 
demands of rules, and the relative reliability of an ex ante assessment of a 
breach of duty measured by rules makes actual or threatened litigation more 
viable for an agg~ieved party in that subset of cases where a breach has 
occurred; seeking legal advice and, if necessary, pursuing legal remedies, is 
less of a gamble than it otherwise would be perceived. In contrast, the use 
of standards presents the opportunity for bad people to push the envelope 
even further than they would under a rules regime, content in the 
knowledge that the ambiguity of the legal situation will continue to deter 
those adversely affected from seeking expensive and risky legal redress. 83 
82. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773-74. The complex and contingent relationship 
between altruism and the use of standards asserted by Kennedy is readily inferred from the 
observation that rules can be used to achieve altruistic objectives. Cf Kelman, supra note 45, 
at 54-63. 
83. Courts have sometimes recognized this phenomenon. See, e.g., United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (holding that agreements, here among 
railroads, to set prices are not exempt from antitrust prosecution just because the price set is 
"reasonable"). The Court argued, 
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Of course, this is more likely to be tme in those contexts-vastly the more 
numerous-in which the stakes are relatively small. 
The likely impact of this phenomenon on the citizenry is complex, but 
certain· broad categories of impacts deserve patiicular notice. In a world 
where legal redress is expensive and atypical, standards, more so than mles, 
will systematically favor the interests of the relatively powerful bad persons 
in their encounters with the relatively weak. 84 The fonner will be able to 
take advantage of the tailored fairness of standards when they see a benefit 
to be gained thereby, whereas the latter will see only vexation and expense 
when faced with an aggressive or intransigent bad person who pushes the 
envelope created by a standard's indefiniteness. Aside from (but in pati 
because of) the injustice that this produces, this is likely to alienate the 
relatively weak from the legal system, which will be seen as serving the 
interests of the powerful, that is, even more than when rules m·e employed. 
And that will undennine the internal point of view among relatively weak 
citizens. They will come to see the necessity of nonlegal forms of rough 
corrective justice, which may entail retaliatory illegal behavior against the 
powerful, especially if the perpetrators thereof can be confident that these 
measures will remain "below the radar screen" of the law. 
Repeated encounters between the comparably weak governed by 
standards will generate a similar erosion of the internal point of view, but 
for slightly different reasons. By decreasing the predictability of success of 
legal redress and increasing the costs of litigation, standards again place 
mcreased pressure on ordinary citizens to find modes of redress outside the 
law. even when opportunism is not a particular problem. At least in the 
context of repeat players, this can mean the development of infonnal nonn 
What is n proper standard by which to judae the fact of reasonable rates? Must the 
rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to amount to a 
sum sufficient to afford the shareholder a fair and reasonable profit upon his 
Investment? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit? . . . [E]ven after the 
standard should be detem1ined there is such an infinite variety of facts entering 
11110 the question of what is a reasonable rate ... that any individual shipper would 
In most cas b 
ch es e apt to abandon the effort to show the unreasonable character of a 
th:r~~-t sooner than hazar~ the_ great exp_ense_ in time an~ money nec_essmy ~o prove 
d" 1. · and at the same tnne mcur the 1ll w1ll of the rmlroad 1tself m all h1s future ,a Jngs with ·t T 
whi·h '. .1 • o say, therefore, that the [Shennan] act excludes agreements 
reas~ a~~ not m unreasonable restraint of trade, and which tend simply to keep up 
reaso~\le rates for transportation, is substantially to leave the question of 
!d. at ~,· 1 _ 3~ eness to the companies themselves. 
he auri~uted·l'~lven Professor Kennedy seems to have been aware of this difficulty, though 
are likelv to b1 t e Wel_ght t~ it. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1696 ("[G]eneral standards 
S.J i3 . " e paper t1gers m practice."). 
a d · ) relatively po rful" d " · 
n social power 
0 
. _w~ an relatn:ely w~ak" I d?. not ~efer to t~e overall wealth 
Thus. a Si11all b , f IndiVIduals, but to the1r relatrve positiOns m a particular encounter. 
'Onte,.t of 1us~ness owner who does house renovations may be "more powerful" in the re sue 1 renov f 1 
novated. \·!u 1 f a IOn wore than the ve1y wealthy customers whose houses are player in the pa~1. 0 1 t~e power m such contexts depends on which party is more of a repeat correlated w·1th 11cu1a11 context. On the other hand, this sense of relative power is probably cu vea t 1 d . · · · 110rners purcha _. an powe1 m a broader sense, because of the pervasive reality of 
smg goods or services from relatively large businesses. 
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systems, which may work relatively well. 85 For the less moral, or le 
cooperative, it can also mean increased resort to violence and other fom1s s~ 
retaliatory self-help. Either way, one can anticipate a citizenry that fin~ 
les_s confi~ence in its legal system, which can only undermine the inte1na~ 
pomt ofv1ew. 
Against ali this, the i.uproved ability of adjudicators using standards to 
tailor justice and (perhaps) improve efficiency in disputes involving those 
who act in ignorance of the law and in disputes between comparably 
sophisticat~d parties ov~r matters significant ~n~ugh to. make legal 
representatwn cost-effective seems a meager palhatlve. It 1s tmlikelv to 
have significant impact on the cultivation or maintenance of the int;rnal 
point of view among the general citizenry. 
Notwithstanding my general conclusion, there is one important 
clarification that is highlighted by the focus on opportunism. As noted 
above, when considering only those who take the internal point of view, the 
matter of sanctions is of little import. Norms that direct officials in the 
application of sanctions speak almost entirely to those who take the external 
point ofview.86 Yet the bad person can be expected to take advantage of 
the anticipated gap between the directive of a guidance nom1 (whether rule 
or standard) and that of an adverse judicial decision, as well as that between 
an adverse judicial decision and real enforcement, that is, when the sheriff 
arrives to arrest someone or to enforce a judgment lien. 87 Without 
sacrificing the advantages of rules in the context of guidance, standards 
have substantial advantages in the context of remedies and sanctions, where 
their flexibility can be used to take account of this calculation by the bad 
person-whose legitimate interest in predictability is minimal-as well as 
to tailor justice for the good persons who, despite their efforts, end up 
before the comi. 88 
This point is illustrated nicely in a comment by Frederick Schauer about 
the context dependence ofthe predictability advantage of rules: 
[I]f the sentence of death were imposed in accordance with accessible 
rules strictly applied, people (including those contemplating committing 
capital crimes) could predict with some confidence which acts would 
generate the death penalty. That predictability, however, would come 
85. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle 
Disputes (1991) (frequently illustrating the preference of citizens for simple rules). 
Ellickson notes that, among the transaction costs that may drive citizens to nonlegal dispute 
resolution is the cost of discerning one's legal rights and duties. See, e.g., id. at 281. 
86. On the limited but extant role of remedies in handling disputes between those who 
take the internal point of view, see Nance, supra note 6, at 909-17. 
87. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 30, at 1279-80. These gaps will not be pertinent to 
the good person's decisions about how to act under the substantive legal norm, but they will 
be pertinent to the good person's decisions about whether to expend resources to seek legal 
redress against a bad person for violation of that norm, thus contributing to the ability of the 
bad person to take advantage of the good, regardless of the form of the guidance norm. 
88. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Alan Hare! & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in 
Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 443 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty !U 
the severity of the sanction or the probability of detection can increase deterrence). 
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only at the risk of putting to death some people who would live if their 
particular acts were scrutinized in the full richness of relevant detail. On 
the other hand, many rules involving the formalities of contracts, wills, 
trusts, and real estate transactions are premised on the assumption that the 
costs of a mistaken decision are comparatively minor, at least when 
compared to the enormous virtues of predictability, without which few 
contracts, wills, trusts, or real estate transactions would ever be 
consummated. 89 
This kind of contrast might seem to concern only differences between law's 
attempts to suppress wrongdoing and law's attempts to facilitate desirable 
private transactions.9° But equally or even more important in the 
comparison is the difference between right and remedy. The determination 
on the death sentence falls unequivocally within the remedial realm of 
sanctions and enforcement, and the specification of factors is primmily 
directed at officials rather than potential criminals, the overwhelming 
majority of whom will never consult these factors in anticipation of 
acting.91 In contrast, the formalities for validity of contracts, wills, and so 
forth, lie in the realm of pre-remedial rights, of widely used guidance norms 
directed primarily at citizens and only secondarily at reviewing officials. 
When the right/remedy distinction comes into relief, the illustrations in 
the quoted passage support the use of standards in the remedial context. 
Indeed, the passage may not go far enough in that direction, for it seems to 
suggest (although this may not have been intended) that the person 
contemplating a capital crime has a legitimate interest in predictability of 
sanction. There is no need to balance ex ante predictability against ex post 
flexibility in such a context, because there is no legitimate interest in 
predictability. Rather, the flexibility of standards at the point of 
determining the sanction protects both the criminal who, on a nuanced 
analysis of the situation, does not deserve the death penalty and the state's 
ability to deter the occasional would-be criminal who attempts to "walk the 
line" by choosing the details of his crime so as to avoid the death penalty or 
who contemplates stepping over the line in reliance on the gap between 
substantive norm and ultimate sanction. So long as remedial standards are 
not set or applied in such a manner as to be incompatible with the guidance 
rules they support, they pose no threat to the legitimate interests in 
predictability held by those who accept the internal point ofview.92 
It is indeed possible that much of the modern agnosticism or ambivalence 
about the choice of rules versus standards can be attributed to a failure to 
89. Schauer, supra note 31, at 142. 
90. Cf Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1690-94. . 
_91. An analogous point can often be made in regard to the guidance norms that specify 
dut1es under the criminal law, but in that context there are other concerns that take 
pr_ominence, including the need to control, in a fairly visible way, the government's power to 
Wield the criminal sanction against even law-abiding citizens. 
th 92. "[Faimess requires only] that there is sufficient warning to one bent on obedience 
(Fat he comes near the proscribed area." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 539 (1948) rankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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keep clear the distinction between rights (guidance norms) and remedie 
(enforcement norms). This would not be surprising, because one of th s 
implications of the Holmesian bad man theory of legal obligation is just t e colla~se the right/remedy distin~tion i_nto. one. overall prediction of th~ 
exerc1se of state power. If we reJect th1s d1stort10n of legal obligation and 
attend to the dominant importance of guidance for the law-resnectino-
citizen, then we can see more clearly the important role of stand~rds --~ 
dealing with those who behave opportunistically toward guidance rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The development and maintenance of the internal point of view presents 
an important, perhaps the most important, collective action problem 
encountered by societies that would try to govern members' conduct by 
law. As Robert Summers recently stated, "Legally well-informed 
addressees who voluntarily implement the law may be the most important 
material components of any [legal] system."93 This is not to deny the 
potentially repressive downside of a widely accepted internal point of view. 
A healthy legal system is not necessarily a just one, just as a democracy is 
not necessarily a just political order. 94 Among other things, a just legal 
system must make a reasonably good allocation between the public and 
private sphere, between the realm in which citizens should internalize 
public norms and the realm in which they are free to pursue private goals 
subject only to whatever nonlegal normative stmctures may apply. In 
response to those who see in a strong commitment to the internal point of 
view the specter of authoritarian demands, v,rith la'w as an instrument of 
exploitation or repression,95 it is important to emphasize that such a 
commitment to the internal point of view is entirely compatible with any of 
several different versions (on the political left or the political right) of a 
commitment to keeping the public sphere small. Whatever the allocation of 
decision making to public and private spheres, the role of citizens who take 
the internal point of view toward law is critical to the success of the 
enterprise as a whole.96 
There are, of course, many factors that affect the strength and extent of 
the internal point of view among the citizenry. One ought not to 
underestimate, however, the importance of choices about legal form. When 
93. See Summers, supra note 23, at 284. 
94. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and 
Abroad (2003 ). 
95. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 16, at 217-19. 
96. Jolm Hasnas argues that the repressive power of the "myth of the rule of law," which 
he associates with the fruitless search for defmite rules, can only be avoided by ending the 
state's monopoly over the legal system and introducing competitive provision of legal 
dispute resolution. Id. at 213-15, 220-33. It may be true that a more competitive system 
could generate more just legal norms, but for the reasons articulated above, it seems likely 
that "producers" in such a competitive system would work hard to provide defmite rules and 
eschew vague standards, whenever that is possible. Indeed, I suspect that it is the monopoly 
power of the state that permits the rather luxuriant use of s\andards in modem law. 
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Lon Fuller famously defined law as the "enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules, "97 he clearly understood the aspirational 
nature of governance by rules. Much of his book, The Morality of Law, is 
devoted to the difficulties that the ordinary subject of law has in finding the 
clear guidance in legal nonns that justifies and psychologically supports the 
intemal point of view. What he also understood, even if he never quite said 
it, is that the quest for rules as distinct }rom standards, whether or not it 
defines the legal enterp1ise, is an important part of law's aspiration. In a 
world such as ours, characterized by a cultural gap between lawmakers and 
citizens, expensive and risky legal redress, ubiquitous bias affecting both 
citizens and adjudicators, and regularly encountered "bad" persons who 
take the external point of view toward law's norms, a presumption in favor 
of rules is warranted in the context of guidance nonns in order to nurture 
the internal point of view. This is so because strengthening the internal 
point of view not only contributes to enforcement efficiency, but also 
cultivates a healthy sense of self-governance. Further, choosing rules over 
standards to achieve these goods does not pose serious threats of allocative 
inefficiency or opportunistic injustice; indeed, the mles are generally 
conducive to allocative efficiency and the prevention of oppmtunistic 
injustice. 
This preference is in the nature of an advisory "rule of thumb." Put 
differently, it is a principle for the creation and management of legal nonns 
by lawmakers; it is not intended to give guidance to citizens in the conduct 
of their affairs, so it is not itself the kind of rule that it recommends. 
FUJiher, it does not recommend just any rule over any standard governing 
the same subject. It might well be desirable, for example, to replace the 
general standard of negligence with a series of negligence per se rules. But 
that does not mean that this preference recommends the remarkably simple 
and predictable alternative mle, "no duty to avoid, or liability for, 
unintentional harms," nor the somewhat more complex rule, "death by 
hanging for all unintentional ham1s." The preference only favors rules 
plausibly accommodating the competing principles and interests involved. 
To put it differently, among the factors that count against a contemplated 
rule, factors that might outweigh the preference, is the fact, if it is a fact, 
that the contemplated rule would yield results less just or less efficient than 
the only available altemative, even if the latter is a standard.98 Still, the 
cumulative force of the relevant long-run considerations is such that we 
should be quite reluctant to reject or abandon a plausible rule in favor of a 
standard. When we do, moreover, it is generally important to provide rule-
~;· Fuller, ~upra note 7, at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ov b · A specml, but important example of this dilemma occurs when legislation creates an 
to ~ Joad rule with potentially horrendous consequences and an interpreting court is forced 
stan~ t~n the effects by injecting a qualifier that converts the rule into what might be a 
that 
0
a\ · ~e~, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 509 (1898) (affim1ing 
langu 11 Y dire~t:' _restraints of trade are reached by the Sherman Antitrust Act's unqualified 
c011-1,.,age ~.rohibihng "every contract, combination, ... or conspiracy, to restrain trade or 
""erce ). 
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based delineation of the subjects governed by mle and those governed b 
standard, lest the benefits of the mles be lost. 99 Y 
A final and important caveat: To argue for a preference for rules d 
· h f h · · h d oes not determme t e exact nature o t e mterpretlve met o ology that jud 
should employ in addressing hard cases arising under mles. A prefere~es 
., d fi . . . . , . 1 .. 1 1 . . ce 10r e 1111teness m legal norms oovwus1y uas genera, ,1m1ts, the mo t importan~ ~f whi~h is the quite predict~ble infelicities of verb~! 
commumcatwn. L1ke Fuller, 100 I would certamly not deny the important 
role of purpose in the interpretation of legal language. Nor would almost 
any intelligent layperson, at least when presented with an example of an 
obvious communicative failure in the drafting of the language of a rule. 
Citizens will expect the legal profession to clean things up to some extent 
and this anticipation must be built into the guidance function of rules: 
Citizens who expect mles to be interpreted intelligently deserve not to be 
disappointed by excessive efforts to remove value judgments from the 
judicial craft. Yet even that seemingly minor concession poses the 
interpretive questions that have consumed so much of the time of legal 
theorists in recent years. Obviously, I have not here attempted to adjudicate 
among competing theories of interpretation. But to interpret mles, one must 
have rules. The preference for which I have argued is simply one that 
favors, in a general way, the rules end of the rules/standards spectrum. 
99. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 50, at 31-32 (discussing the importance of a mechanical 
test for detennining whether a mechanical trespass rule should apply or a judgmental 
nuisance rule (standard) should apply). 
100. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 7, at 82-91,224-32. 
